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Abstract 
International carbon offsetting can help reduce compliance costs in emissions trading 
schemes and at the same time support carbon mitigation projects in developing countries. A 
surprising observation from the European Union Emissions Trading System’s experience 
with offsetting is that companies do not fully utilise offsetting for compliance despite the cost 
advantage in doing so. However, so far there has been limited research evaluating what 
factors influence companies’ decisions to utilise offsets. This paper fills this gap by 
investigating the demand for carbon offsets in tradable permit emissions markets. To do so, 
we use detailed firm-level data on 279 companies regulated under the EU ETS during 2008-
2012. Our findings suggest that there are clear sectoral differences and that, contrary to 
expectations, transaction costs and over-allocation of free allowances are not the key 
determining factors. We find some evidence to support the existence of ‘insetting’, that is, 
companies with subsidiaries in key offset countries are more likely to use a larger share of 
their offset allowance for compliance. Semi-structured interviews with companies supported 
these findings.  
1. Introduction
Carbon trading mechanisms have emerged as the most favoured policy instrument for the 
control of greenhouse gas emissions. Globally, one regional (EU), 4 national (Kazakstan, 
South Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland) and 12 subnational schemes are currently in 
place, covering around 9% of global emissions in 2015 (World Bank and Ecofys 2014). The 
European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) is by far the largest and has been in 
operation since 2005. A decade of its operation offers valuable lessons for all, including 
some 15 more schemes that are currently scheduled or under consideration.  
An important, but under-studied, area of carbon trading is the use of international carbon 
offsetting mechanisms2 which allow installations to invest in international carbon reduction 
projects for compliance. Under the EU ETS, in accordance with the Kyoto Protocol, two 
additional flexible mechanisms have been adopted to improve the effectiveness of the 
scheme: the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI).3 The 
underlying rationale for linking the EU ETS to the mechanisms has been clearly stated in the 
European Commissions’ Linking Directive (2004):   
1 * Corresponding author. Grantham Research Institute for Climate Change and the Environment, London
School of Economics and Political Science Email: M.sato1@lse.ac.uk, ** Independent researcher. *** Centre for 
Resource Management and Environmental Studies, University of West Indies, Cavehill, Barbados. We 
acknowledge support from the Grantham Foundation and the ESRC through the Centre for Climate Change 
Economics and Policy. Special thanks to Luca Taschini for helpful comments.
2 For the purpose of this study, the terms “offsetting” “project-based ” and “flexible” mechanisms are used 
interchangeably.
3 The Clean Development Mechanism is defined in Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol.  It allows a country with an 
emission reduction limitation (Annex B) to implement emission reduction projects in developing countries. Joint 
Implementation is defined in Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol. It allows an Annex B country to earn Emission 
Reduction Units (ERUs) from a project in another Annex B Party.
“Linking the Kyoto project-based mechanisms to the Community scheme [...] will increase 
the diversity of low-cost compliance options … leading to a reduction of the overall costs of 
compliance … while improving the liquidity of the Community market in greenhouse gas 
emission allowances.” 
As a result of these mechanisms, emissions reductions in projects are exchanged for credits 
that could be used by companies covered by the EU ETS to meet a set share of their 
compliance requirement, a process commonly referred to as offsetting. More specifically, 
companies can acquire Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) from CDM projects or 
Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) from JI projects. These can be purchased directly from the 
original party or by directly investing in CDM or JI projects (primary CERs or ERUs) or from 
the marketplace (secondary CERs and ERUs). 
Curiously, however, the uptake of low-cost compliance options has varied considerably 
across operators. Despite the clear economic incentives to maximise the use of offsets 
(because the prices in offset markets have been low relative to the EU ETS) not all firms 
chose to do so. This suggests the existence of factors other than regulatory cost 
minimisation that drives the uptake of offsetting. According to one survey which asked 
companies regulated under the EU ETS about their compliance strategies, around 20% of 
respondents used trading as the primary compliance strategy, 30% reduced their own 
emissions, 5% used CDM/JI projects and over 50% used a combination of the three (Point 
Carbon 2008).  
While much attention has been paid to the supply side of offset markets, surprisingly, there 
has been little research undertaken to date to understand the demand for international 
credits. This paper aims to fill this gap and to this end, we adopt two approaches. First, we 
conduct a quantitative assessment of the factors driving the observed variation in the use of 
offsetting across companies regulated under the EU ETS, and examine how this varies 
between sectors and credit types: CDM and JI. To do so, we exploit the large variation in 
firms regulated under the EU ETS and use detailed firm level data, Second, we use a series 
of semi-structured interviews to obtain qualitative evidence to support our findings.  
By better understanding the corporate decision-making processes and market realities of 
offsetting, this paper aims to contribute to discussion on the assessment and design of 
flexible mechanisms in emissions trading schemes globally. Indeed, many of the intended 
nationally determined contributions (INDCs) pledged leading up to the Paris Conference of 
the Parties (COP) in 2015 also included the use of international credits for compliance. 
We find new and interesting evidence how variation in offset usage across firms relate to 
observable characteristics including firm size, sector, and ownership structure. For example, 
our data reveals that contrary to expectations and all else being equal, smaller firms use 
relatively more offsets, and that firms that receive excess free allocation (relative to their 
emissions) are more likely to undertake more offsetting. In terms of sectors, firms in steel 
and cement are most likely to use offsetting for compliance. Our results also finds new 
evidence to support the phenomena of ‘insetting’ within the EU ETS (Tipper et al 2009). This 
describes the behaviour of firms to take actions to reduce carbon emissions within the 
sphere of influence or interest of a company, but beyond its day-to-day activities. For 
example, actions taken to reduce carbon emissions in suppliers or subsidiaries would fall 
within this definition. Our results indicate that some amount of insetting has occurred but the 
role of subsidiaries on firms’ offsetting behaviour is mixed across industry and country – with 
greater impact of subsidiaries in JI countries than CDM, reflecting the greater institutional 
requirements and need for local expertise in this mechanism. These findings are broadly 
supported by the interviews conducted. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives the context by outlining the structures of 
the EU ETS and the use of offsets in the scheme. Section 3 discusses factors influencing 
corporate strategy in relation to project-based mechanisms, drawing on insights from the 
existing literature. Section 4 presents the quantitative analysis including data, methods and 
results. Section 5 presents the qualitative assessment and the additional insights gained 
from interviews with company representatives. Section 6 offers some discussion of our 
findings, policy implications and concludes. 
2. Offsetting in EU ETS Phase 2 (2008-2012)
The EU ETS provides an excellent case study to explore the role of offsetting in emissions 
trading due to its maturity and the extensive use of offsetting. The EU ETS’s operation has 
been split into three distinct phases each with varying regulations relating to the use of 
offsets. Phase I between 2005 and 2007 was designed as a self-contained pilot phase. 
There were no provisions for the use of offsets, however the regulatory mechanisms for the 
use of offsets in Phase II had already been put in place through the so-called ‘Linking 
Directive’. The Directive allowed Member States to grant operators the right to use 
international credits up to a defined percentage through their National Allocation Plans 
(NAPs), with CERs from the CDM and ERUs from JI becoming fully fungible with the EU 
ETS’s EU Allowance Unit (EUAs). Each member state had the right to define for itself the 
limit of the use of CERs and ERUs – having regard for the provisions of the Kyoto Protocol 
and the Marrakesh Accords and the requirement that credits must be supplemental to 
domestic action.  
Figure 1. Offset usage during EU ETS Phase 2 by type Source: EUTL 
Table 1: Usage of CER and ERU credits by companies with the largest entitlements in Phase 2 
Type Total %Total SUM Limit Usage 
RWE Group CER 15236226 53.3% 28582435 74,323,236 38.5% ERU 13346209 46.7% 
E.ON AG CER 41271785 77.7% 53140146 65629103 81%ERU 11868361 22.3% 
Vattenfall AB CER 19991555 93% 21493540 63812329 33.7% ERU 1501985 7% 
ArcelorMittal CER 33049118 73% 45270852 52724453 86% ERU 12221734 27%
Endesa S.A. CER 25966307 96.6% 26891586 52556175 51.2% ERU 925279 3.4% 
ENEL SpA CER 19155239 99.1% 19333536 36372226 53.2% ERU 178297 0.9% 
PGE S.A. CER 25692493 95.1% 27009121 27010450 100% ERU 1316628 4.9% 
EDF Group CER 5126868 56.4% 9086558 24757525 36.7% ERU 3959690 43.6%
ThyssenKrupp 
AG 
CER 6388908 31.3% 20432367 22854947 89.4% ERU 14043459 68.7% 
ČEZ Group CER 5134137 27.4% 18760787 22570774 83.1% ERU 13626650 72.6%
GdF Suez CER 13310660 71.1% 18724123 21796754 85.9% ERU 5413463 28.9%
PPC S.A. CER 9651426 48.4% 19935392 19935392 100% ERU 10283966 51.6%
Iberdrola S.A. CER 9853244 75.7% 13017247 19102500 68.1% ERU 3164003 24.3%
Gas Natural 
Fenosa 
CER 7557673 72.8% 10385214 19021283 54.6% ERU 2827541 27.2% 
Eni S.p.A. CER 714778 38.3% 1864778 17938817 10.4% ERU 1150000 61.7%
EDP S.A. CER 11836542 80.3% 14746252 16182689 91.1% ERU 2909710 19.7%
Lafarge SA CER 14271118 100% 14271234 15453485 92.3% ERU 116 0 
Tata Steel CER 10976027 82.5% 13307735 15179820 87.7% ERU 2331708 17.5%
Total S.A. CER 4628156 33.6% 13782070 14772445 93.3% ERU 9153914 66.4%
STEAG GmbH CER 7587429 59.4% 12782846 14715297 87% ERU 5195417 40.6%
Heidelberg 
Cement 
CER 1661910 12.1% 
13738082 13953079 93.3% 
ERU 12076172 87.9% 
This method of allocation meant that there was in effect an overall cap of the total amount of 
credits allowed into the EU ETS. The total sum of the flexible space allowed across member 
state came to 1.4 billion tonnes over Phase 2 (2008-2012)4 of which around 76% was used. 
As shown in Figure 1, the use of offset credits, both CERs and ERUs grew rapidly, 
throughout Phase II of the scheme, with annual usage substantially higher in 2011 and 2012 
than in 2008.5  
Within this overall flexible space, there was a high range of variability across member states 
and industries and over time in how much credits could be used for compliance. Some 
countries such as Estonia disallowed any offset use, while Germany and UK allowed 
companies to use offsets up to 22% and 8% of compliance respectively (Trotignon 2012).  
Along with such quantitative restrictions, quality restrictions were also applied on the use of 
credits, mostly at the European level. For example, credits originating from nuclear facilities 
or relating to Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) were excluded. Further, 
from the beginning of Phase III (2013), CERs and ERUs were no longer compliance units – 
and could not be surrendered directly. Instead they were required to be exchanged with 
EUAs. Credits from industrial gas destruction projects and those from non-Least Developed 
Countries (in particular, CERSs from China and India) were disallowed from April 2013. 
How did companies respond to these flexibility mechanism rules under the EU ETS? Table 1 
shows the usage of CER and ERU credits by 21 companies with the largest offset 
entitlements in Phase 2. What is striking is the variability of uptake of offsetting across 
companies. Particularly in the energy sector, some notable actors have been inactive in their 
use of offset credits, regardless of existing deficits of allowances. For instance, RWE, 
Vattenfall or EDF or Eni used less than 50% of their entitlements. At the same time, there 
are companies that have used the whole of their available limit, such as both Polish PGE 
and Greek PPC. Uptake by companies in the iron and steel (ArcelorMittal, ThyssenKrupp) 
and cement (Lafarge, HeidelberCement) sectors tend to be consistently high, nearing or 
exceeding 90% in most cases.  
3. Factors influencing corporate strategy in relation to project-based mechanisms
– insights from the related literature
The existing literature on project-based flexible mechanisms has focused on the supply side, 
and there is little written on the nature of the demand for CDM or JI credits. In particular, 
existing studies tend to assess effective design of flexible mechanisms (Paulsson 2009), the 
issue of additionality (Wara and Victor 2008, Schneider 2009, Grubb et al 2011, Hayashi and 
Michaelowa 2013) as well as its contribution to sustainable development (Sutter and Parreno 
2007, Schneider 2007, Olsen 2007).  
There is limited academic literature on the demand for carbon offsets and to our knowledge, 
no papers have yet explicitly examined the drivers of investment in CDM and JI empirically. 
However, discussions in the related literature point to a number of potential factors that may 
drive differences in offsetting behaviour across firms.  
Sandbag (2010a, 2010b, 2012) highlights sectoral differences in offsetting behaviour, by 
offering a descriptive analysis of the CER and JI markets focusing on the largest companies 
4  See http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/pre2013/index_en.htm 
5 A large amount of this influx came from industrial gas destruction projects – which raised doubts over their
additionality and lead to revised plans for Phase III.
using offsets. They show that the power sector (which has the most stringent cap) is the 
most active in the pursuit of cheaper offsets as expected. This suggests that the difference 
between allocation and verified emissions (i.e. overallocation of free allowances) may play 
a role, such that companies that receive significant surplus free allowances relative to 
verified emissions may be less likely to maximise offset use. Indeed, Lutken and Michaelowa 
(2008) argues that overallocation could change the motivation of companies that have 
already fulfilled obligations of the EU ETS, from emissions reductions cheaply to extracting 
financial arbitrage. However, the evidence to support this is not found in the Sandbag reports 
– they find that companies that received significant surpluses of allowances, mainly steel
and cement sectors, have also pursued additional profits through trading offsets. 
Interestingly, an increasing number of credits used by steel and cement sectors have 
originated from projects in competing companies (Sandbag 2012). 
Some studies suggest that firm size may affect offsetting behaviour, primarily due to the 
existence of transaction costs. Transaction costs pose a barrier to exercise the opportunity 
to use offsets for compliance, suggesting the importance of internal capacity at the company 
level. This also suggests that smaller companies maybe more constrained in terms of 
managerial availability and manpower, reducing their ability to collect the necessary 
information and make an informed decision (Buckley 1989). Trotingnon (2012) looks at 
offseting in EU ETS in 2008 and 2009 and finds that factors such as transaction costs 
particularly affect small installations. Braun et al (2015) find, using a stylised model and 
annual compliance data from the EU ETS, that offset usage quotas coupled with firm-level 
heterogeneity in transaction costs explains variation in compliance options used across 
firms.  
On the other hand, transaction costs also suggests that barriers may be lower for companies 
with international linkages in offset countries. Indeed, a number of studies point to the 
importance of having international subsidiaries. Michaelowa and Jotzo (2005) argue that 
transaction costs (e.g. search costs and negotiation costs) in CDM projects can account for 
a significant share of the total cost of the investment but can be eliminated in the case of 
investment in their own subsidiary. Thus, companies with an international presence have 
better opportunity to invest in projects. Lutken and Michaelowa (2008) suggest that offsetting 
behaviour is linked to companies’ existing international operations, explaining that the prime 
driver of companies’ decisions lay in their core business activity. They argue that companies 
in Annex B countries are less likely to divert from their core business, technology and 
investment destination and invest in unfamiliar sectors or countries. These argument links to 
the concept of insetting, introduced formally by Tipper et al (2009) as: ‘a 
partnership/investment in an emission reducing activity within the sphere of influence or 
interest of a company (outside WBCSD Scopes 1 and 2), whereby the GHG reductions are 
acknowledged to be created through partnership and where mutual benefit is derived.’ (p.3) 
Despite coverage in the grey literature and the international press (Guardian 2015), insetting 
has not yet been studied academically to our knowledge.  
Trotingnon (2012) argues that small installations are more affected by the lack of capacity to 
deal with uncertainty regarding the nature of the CERs on offer. Nazifi (2013)’s investigation 
into the price spread between EUAs and CERs finds that the spread is in part driven by the 
uncertainty associated with offsets, mostly concerning financial institutions delivering them, 
as well as the uncertainty around the long-term future of the overall market. One of the 
implications is that the usage of the CDM credits would be affected by the capacity and 
willingness of the company to take on the risk. This is in line with Lutken and Michaelowa 
(2008)’s assessment that corporate personality and culture also play a role in investment 
decisions choices around risk-taking and compliance behaviour.   
Relatedly, a number of papers have examined the motivations of actors in the voluntary 
carbon market focusing on markets in the US (Erickson et al 2013) and international air 
passengers (Mair 2011). Peters-Stanley and Yin (2013) find that purchases are generally 
motivated by Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), rather than the need to meet 
regulatory requirements. The demand in the voluntary sector differs significantly in both size 
and type from the compliance market, such as the EU ETS, that dominates purchases of 
CDM and JI credits (Peters-Stanley and Yin 2013, World Bank and Ecofys 2014).  
In sum, the literature points to a number of firm level characteristics that may influence offset 
usage including main economic activity, firm size, capacity to undertake trading, risk 
preferences, CSR policy, ratio between allocation and emissions, and international 
subsidiaries. Section 4 and 5 will go on to assess quantitatively and qualitatively whether 
there is evidence of these factors in the behaviour of firms under the EU ETS.  
4. Quantitative analysis
4.1 Data sources 
The European Union Transaction Log (EUTL) provides data for each EU ETS installation, 
the level of verified emissions, accredited allowances and surrendered units. The data on 
surrendered units are available by type of units EUAs, CERs and ERUs until 2012. From 
2013, only data on the total surrendered units is available and the use of CDM or JI credits 
used for compliance could no longer be tracked. For this reason, this analysis uses data for 
EU ETS Phase 2 (2008-2012). 
The unit of analysis here is the company (or operator), hence if one company has several 
installations covered under the EU ETS, we aggregate them up to the company level. This 
analysis covers 279 operators. Under this aggregation method, installations are assigned to 
the company that owned them prior to Phase 2, even if ownership changed during the Phase 
2 period. This is because often, the strategic response and especially the choice of project 
financing, has been made prior to or in the early years. In the raw EUTL data, information on 
the firm or sector to which the installation belongs is not always provided. For this reason, 
we use a cleaned and enriched version of the EUTL data which has addressed these 
shortcomings.6  
The sample represents offset entitlement greater than 500,000 credits, accounting for nearly 
85% of all offset entitlements. It covers mainly large and medium-sized parent companies 
and as such, has limited explanatory power for smaller companies.  
A number of factors that explain the differences in offset usage for compliance have been 
discussed in the literature (Section 3) including firm characteristics. We obtained information 
on several observable variables including firm size, annual turnover, main activity and 
international subsidiaries by country from the Orbis database (Bureau van Dijk). In particular, 
we are interested in the number of subsidiaries companies have in key CDM and JI 
countries (China, India, Brazil, Mexico, Russia and Poland). The firm level data was matched 
with the EUTL data on offset use.  
4.2 Descriptive data 
As shown in Table 2, during Phase 2 (2008-2012), companies did not fully use the 
opportunity to comply with the EU ETS obligation using offset credits, despite their cheaper 
6 This data was provided by the Global Carbon team at Statkraft. 
price. Out of the total entitlement of 1.4 billion credits available from the NAPs, nearly 1.06 
billion CERs and ERUs were surrendered during Phase 2 which results in close to 76 per 
cent usage rate within the scheme.  
What we can also observe is that the use of both CERs and ERUs increased over time. The 
share of CDM emissions reductions has been almost twice that of JI for the entirety of Phase 
2. This can be explained by the earlier development of the CDM, which was established in
2000, and accepted within the EU ETS in 2006, while JI was established later. Finally, the 
pattern was undoubtedly influenced by the awaited political decisions banning the use of 
credits from industrial gases announced in 2011, to take effect from 2013. This resulted in 
the increased offsets usage for compliance in 2011 and 2012 (e.g. an increase by 103% of 
HFC23 CERs surrendered in 2011– Sandbag 2012), indicating that the ability to tolerate risk 
was relevant for companies’ compliance decisions.  
Table 2. Summary of the aggregate compliance in Phase 2 (in 1,000) 
Table 3 summarizes the descriptive data for different sectors.7 The combustion sector has 
been the largest in each year, bearing the majority of verified emissions as well as the 
highest restrictions. Two other carbon intensive industries – iron and steel production as well 
as cement production – have been viewed as threatened by competitive loss due to carbon 
limits, but have been generously issued free allocations.  
From Table 3, it is evident that two sectors - energy and oil refining - submitted offsets 
totalling about 20% of their verified emissions, and had the lowest usage rates of all the 
sectors, with combustion of fuels being the only sector in the sample with a negative 
balance. At the same time, some energy intensive companies had a surplus of allowances 
which did not prevent them from investing in the flexible mechanisms, and treating it as an 
opportunity for profit beyond their mandatory obligation for mitigation.  
This result is somewhat counter-intuitive, especially in the case of combustion plants, and 
can partially be explained by the use of installation-level data for this table, which classifies 
installations based on their activity while disregarding the owner’s general business area. To 
illustrate this, out of 113 installations operated by ArcelorMittal, only 46 have a main activity 
related to the production of iron and steel, with 38 allocated to the combustion of fuels. This 
example shows that an analysis at the installation-level can be misleading, and should be 
carefully interpreted. For this reason, our quantitative analysis below is performed using 
company-level data. 
7 The categorization has been made using the NACE Rev 2 classification.  
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total 
Verified 
emissions 2,119,673 1,879,607 1,938,881 1,904,532 1,951,197 9,793,890 
Distributed 
allowances 1,957,937 1,972,033 1,994,366 2,016,726 2,228,584 10,169,646 
Total 
offsets 
surrendered 
83,585 80,836 137,153 253,625 503,722 1,058,921 
CERs 83,536 77,605 117,037 177,832 219,572 675,581 
% 99.94% 96.00% 85.33% 70.12% 43.59% 63.80% 
ERUs 49 3,231 20,116 75,794 284,150 383,340 
% 0.06% 4.00% 14.67% 29.88% 56.41% 36.20% 
Table 3: Surrendered offsets per sector in Phase 2 (in 1,000) 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for variable 
Variable Average Standard 
Deviation 
Units Description Source 
Usage 0.863 0.232 Percentage Usage of allowable 
offsets  
EUTL 
Average 
revenue 
18,712,965 49,978,175 € Average annual 
revenue from the 
company 2008-2012 
Orbis 
Number of 
subsidiaries 
per revenue 
9.05 16.64 Number /€ of 
revenue (ln) 
Number of subsidiaries 
per unit of revenue (ln) 
Orbis 
Phase 3 
allocation 
365,162 709,695 EUAs Numbers of EUAs 
freely allocated in 
Phase 3 
EUTL 
Phase 2 over-
allocation 
-123,180 22,701,930 EUAs  Number of EUAs
allocated compared to 
verified emissions 
EUTL 
Subsidiary in 
China 
1.83 6.60 Number of 
subsidiaries 
Number of subsidiaries 
in China 
Orbis 
Subsidiary in 
Brazil 
1.31 4.83 Number of 
subsidiaries 
Number of subsidiaries 
in Brazil 
Orbis 
Subsidiary in 
Mexico 
1.23 3.77 Number of 
subsidiaries 
Number of subsidiaries 
in Mexico 
Orbis 
Subsidiary in 
India 
0.75 3.02 Number of 
subsidiaries 
Number of subsidiaries 
in India 
Orbis 
Subsidiary in 
Russia 
1.29 7.94 Number of 
subsidiaries 
Number of subsidiaries 
in Russia 
Orbis 
Subsidiary in 2.04 6.29 Number of Number of subsidiaries Orbis 
Main 
Activity 
Credit 
entitlement CERs  ERUs  Usage  
Verified
Emissions Surplus Allocation 
Combustion 
of fuels 970,840 466,228 227,156 71% 7,138,754 -550,723 6,588,031
Refining of 
mineral oil 95,884 31,295 33,030 67% 703,652 52,749 756,401
Production 
of pig iron 
or steel 
120,947 57,169 51,635 90% 501.910 347,419 849,329
Production 
of cement 
clinker and 
lime 
116,275 70,966 39,663 95% 570,226 195,698 765,924
Remaining 94,082 49,923 31,855 87% 869,157 340,803 1,209,960
Grand Total 1,398,028 675,581 383,340 76% 9,783,700 385,946 10,169,646
Poland subsidiaries in Poland 
Subsidiary in 
CDM countries 
5.11 13.01 Number of 
subsidiaries 
Number of subsidiaries 
in Brazil, China, Mexico 
and India 
Orbis 
Subsidiary in JI 
countries 
3.62 10.83 Number of 
subsidiaries 
Number of subsidiaries 
in Russia and Poland  
Orbis 
 
4.3 Empirical Strategy 
The aim here is not to develop a full or complete explanation of cross-company variation in 
offset usage. Instead, it is to assess the impact of observable company characteristics on 
their use of offsets for EU ETS compliance. The analysis consists of cross-sectional ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression of firm-level offset usage (CDM and JI) in EU ETS Phase 2 
(aggregating 2008-2012) on a number of variables: 
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖  = 𝛼𝛼0 +𝛼𝛼1(𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑈𝑈𝑂𝑂𝑈𝑈𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑈𝑈𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂) + 𝛼𝛼2(𝑂𝑂𝑈𝑈𝑂𝑂𝑈𝑈𝑂𝑂𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) + 𝛼𝛼3(𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂)+ 𝛼𝛼4(𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈3) + 𝛼𝛼5(𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝑂𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑈𝑈𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) 
Here, USAGE is the outcome and dependent variable (the number of CERs and ERUs 
surrendered as a percentage of the allowable level) at the company level. We regress this 
on the free allocation volume as a percentage of verified emissions (OVERALLOCATION), 
average yearly revenue of the parent company in logs (REVENUE) which proxies for 
company size, a sector dummy defined as the parent company’s core business activity 
(SECTOR), aggregate offset entitlements for a company in Phase 3 (PHASE3) to control for 
the effect of future allocation decisions upon current behaviour and the number of registered 
subsidiaries of the parent company per unit of revenue (SUBSIDIARIES) to represent the 
internal capacity for offsetting. A full description of the variables and their sources are 
provided in Table 4.  
In order to test the role of subsidiaries in offsetting (or insetting) behaviour, we account only 
for those subsidiaries in relevant countries participating in offset mechanisms. Under the 
CDM, Annex I countries could invest in developing countries. By the end of 2012, only 63 of 
them issued any credits with China, India, South Korea, Brazil and Mexico accounting for 
over 90% of them (UNEP DTU). The scale of Joint Implementation was even smaller, the 
projects took place in only 15 countries with Poland and Russia accounting for a majority of 
ERUs issued in that period (UNEP DTU). We therefore limited our analysis of subsidiaries in 
CDM countries to China, India, Mexico and Brazil and Russia and Poland for JI. 
As the analysis uses company-level data, sectoral classification was based on the main 
business activity of the company regardless of the classification of each individual 
installation, with companies split into five categories: Energy, Oil, Cement, Steel and other. A 
set of four dummy variables was used to capture this categorisation. As discussed above, 
the reason for the choice is varying exposure in terms of stringency of allocation, vertical and 
horizontal coverage of the sector, and international presence. Variables were tested for 
multicollinearity with no serious problems identified.  
4.4 Results 
Table 5 column 1 shows the results for the whole sample of data but without country-level 
subsidiary effects. Column 2 includes variables for the number of subsidiaries in key CDM 
and JI countries. Column 3 includes the total number of subsidiaries in these countries.  
A number of key results emerge from examining the sample as a whole. The results indicate 
that, all else equal, smaller companies (in terms of turnover) tend to use a greater 
percentage of their offset allowance. If company size is assumed to be inversely related to 
transaction costs, this finding then contradicts the analytical and theoretical arguments 
presented above that smaller companies offset less due to high transaction costs. In 
addition, overallocation in Phase 2 is positively linked with offset usage. This is again 
contrary to theoretical predictions discussed in Section 3, that offset use increases with 
exposure to carbon prices. These two surprising results indicate the complex nature of 
determinants of offseting behaviour, and the existence of other confounding factors. For 
example, there may be unobserved characteristics of firms with over-allocation (e.g. higher 
capacity to lobby for more free allocation and/or higher trading capacity to undertake 
arbitrage).  
The results in Table 5 also indicate that there are sectoral differences in the offset usage 
with steel and cement sectors being more likely to use a greater share of their offset 
allowance relative to the baseline sector (energy). This result is interesting because it again 
contradicts expectations based on transaction costs-linked arguments. That is, energy 
companies are expected to fully utilise offset allowance because they are more likely to 
benefit from existing capacity and expertise in commodities trading. Several explanations 
may be possible for the result that steel and cement companies use a larger share of offset 
allowances. They may have been more likely to be tied into CDM or JI projects for insetting 
purposes and, given the upfront investment, it makes economic sense to realise and utilise 
the flow of credits. Also, cement and steel companies may have increasingly turned to profit-
making through trading international credits, as they faced greater financial difficulty during 
Phase 2 from the economic downturn in Europe relative to the energy sector. The energy 
sector may also have faced higher restrictions, both internal and external, to participate in 
such trading, stemming from their historical background as predominantly state-owned 
entities. Higher allocation in Phase 3 is linked to higher use of offset allowances, but the 
effect is not significant in all specifications. The number of subsidiaries per unit of revenue 
had no significant effect. 
In terms of international linkages, a number of interesting findings emerge. As shown in 
column 2, the existence of subsidiaries in CDM countries (China, India, Brazil or Mexico) do 
not influence usage, whereas having more subsidiaries in JI countries (Russia and Poland) 
is linked with using more offsets. The difference between CDM and JI countries is 
highlighted in column 3, when we include totals for the number of subsidiaries in key CDM 
and JI countries – only the JI variable is positive and significant. 
Table 5: Regression results using the full sample of firms 
(1) (2) (3)
Average revenue 
(Ln) 
-0.0255** -0.0275*** -0.0276***
(0.0101) (0.0104) (0.0104) 
Number of 
subsidiaries per 
revenue 
-0.000574 -0.000921 -0.000843
(0.000992) (0.00101) (0.00107) 
Oil -0.0328 -0.0291 -0.0368
(0.0571) (0.0579) (0.0575) 
Steel 0.0876** 0.0993** 0.0954** 
(0.0385) (0.0409) (0.0391) 
Cement 0.0863*** 0.0957*** 0.0886*** 
(0.0299) (0.0316) (0.0302) 
Other 0.122*** 0.130*** 0.123*** 
(0.0326) (0.0344) (0.0325) 
Phase 3 allocation 3.08e-08* 1.88e-08 2.64e-08* 
(1.63e-08) (1.66e-08) (1.59e-08) 
Phase 2 
overallocation 
1.44e-09*** 1.56e-09*** 1.53e-09*** 
(4.60e-10) (5.00e-10) (4.70e-10) 
Subsidiary in China -0.00162
(0.00245)
Subsidiary in Brazil -0.00164
(0.00271)
Subsidiary in 
Mexico 
0.00496
(0.00418) 
Subsidiary in India 0.000475 
(0.00358) 
Subsidiary in 
Russia 
0.00240*** 
(0.000560) 
Subsidiary in 
Poland 
0.00512*** 
(0.00117) 
Subsidiary in CDM 
countries 
-4.90e-05
(0.00115) 
Subsidiary in JI 
countries 
0.00290*** 
(0.000662) 
Constant 1.198*** 1.216*** 1.223*** 
(0.139) (0.143) (0.143) 
Observations 265 265 265 
R-squared 0.155 0.181 0.172
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
We now examine if we split the sample by key industrial groups (Table 6) resulting with 
smalller sample size hence less explanatory power. Of most interest here is the differential 
effect of specific country subsidiaries across industrial groups. Having subsidiaries in Brazil 
increases the use of offsets in the Oil and Steel sectors, as well as the Other sector. Having 
subsidiaries in China is associated with reduced offset use for energy firms. Subsidiaries in 
Mexico reduced offset use for oil and steel firms, while increasing use in other firms. Energy 
firms with more subsidiaries in India used more offsets. For key JI countries having 
subsidiaries in Russia increased offset use for oil firms, while Polish subsidiaries increased 
offset use in Energy and Oil firms. Due to the small sample size, we take caution in the 
interpretation of these coefficients, as well as those on other variables. Average revenue has 
a negative, significant effect only for energy companies. Oil companies with more 
subsidiaries per revenue use less of their offset allowance. We find results for Phase 3 
allocation and Phase 2 overallocation that are consistent with the whole sample only for 
energy companies.  
Table 6: Regression results by industry 
Energy Oil Steel Cement Other 
Average revenue 
(Ln) 
-0.0352** -0.0113 -0.0234 -0.00577 -0.0194
(0.0174) (0.0392) (0.0396) (0.0157) (0.0157) 
Number of 
subsidiaries per 
revenue 
0.000222 -0.0246*** -0.00282 0.000107 -0.00245
(0.00182) (0.00700) (0.00389) (0.000794) (0.00236) 
Phase 3 allocation 5.25e-08** 2.41e-07 6.09e-08 1.88e-08 2.40e-07* 
(2.44e-08) (2.25e-07) (3.65e-08) (1.12e-08) (1.36e-07) 
Phase 2 
overallocation 
1.96e-09*** 4.89e-09 3.54e-09 1.37e-10 -4.25e-10
(5.71e-10) (4.35e-09) (3.68e-09) (1.10e-09) (6.91e-09) 
Subsidiary in China -0.0450* -0.0356 0.0222 0.00776 -0.000834
(0.0229) (0.0284) (0.0499) (0.00952) (0.00230) 
Subsidiary in Brazil -0.00246 0.418*** 0.0995** -4.87e-05 0.0116**
(0.00359) (0.0678) (0.0330) (0.00729) (0.00519) 
Subsidiary in 
Mexico 
0.00420 -0.198*** -0.122** 0.00400 0.0204*
(0.00590) (0.0556) (0.0526) (0.00395) (0.0114) 
Subsidiary in India 0.0184*** -0.193 -0.00877 -0.00695 -0.0244*
(0.00622) (0.140) (0.00912) (0.0205) (0.0143) 
Subsidiary in Russia -0.00307 0.00455*** 0.152 -0.0263 0.00440
(0.00490) (0.00109) (0.0931) (0.0231) (0.00617) 
Subsidiary in Poland 0.00439*** 0.00826** 0.0269 0.00420 -0.00298
(0.00128) (0.00304) (0.0206) (0.00309) (0.00318) 
Constant 1.317*** 0.972* 1.233* 1.018*** 1.200*** 
(0.240) (0.570) (0.577) (0.203) (0.209) 
Observations 109 40 19 37 60 
R-squared 0.184 0.349 0.359 0.081 0.168 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Overall, this analysis represents first steps towards quantitatively understanding how 
observable characteristics of firms explain company behaviour in terms of offsetting and 
insetting activity. Our results support some of the explanations discussed in previous 
literature, whilst contradicting others. In particular, we find some support to the arguments 
that offset uptake is differentiated across sectors, that international linkages matters and 
insetting is occurring in some sectors - having subsidiary companies in host countries of JI 
and CDM projects can increase likelihood of using offsets for compliance.  
5. Qualitative analysis
5.1 Methodology 
To supplement the quantitative analysis, we also sought to understand offsetting behaviour 
through semi-structured telephone interviews with company representatives. Specifically, 
interviews were conducted in 2014 with representatives of 7 companies covered by the EU 
ETS from two sectors (Energy and cement). The interview discussions were formulated 
around questions (presented the in Appendix) about company structure, overall compliance 
strategy and the offset purchasing approach. The exact wording of questions and the order 
in which the topics were covered varied by interview. Each interview lasted between 30 and 
90 minutes. The general profile of an interviewee in the sample is a person responsible for 
the management of the company’s account of carbon credits, who was involved in the EU 
ETS compliance throughout the entire Phase 2.  
 
5.2 Results 
The interviews conducted with market participants have indicated several patterns in 
strategic response to offsetting that relate closely to the variables identified in the literature in 
Section 3 and from the quantitative analysis in Section 4. All interviewees brought up 
multiple factors influencing these decisions, with the price of offsets identified as the 
leading determinant in their decision making process.  
The role of international linkages and subsidiaries was identified in the interviews with 
large cement companies, who represented the only companies in the sample that practiced 
insetting in JI and CDM projects within their own subsidiaries. In both cases, the decisions 
were made prior to Phase 2. Although the political uncertainty at the time was considered, it 
did not impede investment suggesting that operating in subsidiaries helped to mitigate some 
of the uncertainty that these firms may otherwise have faced. This evidence is consistent 
with our results in Section 4, that having subsidiaries can affect offset usage, in certain 
sectors and countries.  
The interviews also revealed the importance of variables that are harder to observe and 
quantify, such as corporate personality, culture and strategy. For example, when asked 
about motivations for offset use, some interviewees explained that where credits were 
traded, this was done only to meet the needs of the installations. In other words, the 
established trading desks were used only to serve the internal needs of the company, and 
not for further profit making, speculation and trading beyond required volumes. 
Interviews with energy companies revealed that none had invested in JI or CDM projects in 
their subsidiaries – again highlighting the importance of sectoral differences. The indicated 
impediments were a combination of lack of market knowledge and relationships with 
necessary parties, uncertainty within the CDM and JI schemes, and lack of knowledge of the 
technologies which dominated the project market. Barriers to trade have also been indicated 
by an Eastern European utility, who managed carbon portfolios of smaller companies, for 
which the operational and analytical costs were too high to set up their own desks – 
highlighting the crucial role of transaction costs in some types of firms (though not 
necessarily fully correlated to firm size).  
Other factors that play a role in offsetting behaviours surfaced through the interviews. For 
example, one European energy company (an active buyer of primary credits), stated that 
their participation in offset projects was motivated by the strategic need to learn about new 
technologies and markets. The importance of parallel environmental policies as also 
mentioned, in particular the EU Renewable Energy Directive. Specifically, a Southern 
European utility decided to significantly diversify its fuel mix and invested in new, renewable 
sources both internal and external to the company. Finally, the same companies indicated 
that the possibility to bank allowances within Phase 2 and from Phase 2 to Phase 3 has 
played a significant role in their compliance strategy and has been greatly utilised to limit the 
costs of compliance. 
    
6. Discussion 
The EU ETS provides useful experience and insights into drivers of demand for international 
carbon credits. While globally, the focus shifted towards domestic action in the lead up to the 
Paris COP in 2015, to meet ambitious global CO2 mitigation goals, it is likely that 
international carbon trading will be an important part of post 2020 climate actions, hence it is 
important to incorporate lessons learnt to improve the efficiency of future offsetting 
mechanisms.  
This paper aims to further the understanding on the demand side of the offsets market. Why 
do some firms buy international credits for compliance while others don’t? We survey the 
existing literature and conduct both quantitative and qualitative analysis to examine these 
issues. We find that companies’ behaviour with regards to offsetting are influenced by a 
number of factors, both observable and non-observable.  
Using firm level data for the EU ETS Phase 2 period, our regression analysis findings 
contradict two expected relationships: that larger firms and those more exposed to carbon 
costs (those with less free allocation relative to emissions) are more likely to use higher 
share of offset for compliance. These results indicate that the corporate strategies on offset 
decisions are complex and there are many confounding factors. For example our findings do 
not support arguments that larger companies are more likely to engage in offsetting because 
they benefit from larger internal capacity to engage in carbon trading. One reason for our 
findings may be that the importance of carbon costs to the balance sheets may be less for 
large firms than for smaller industrial firms with high emissions and low turnover. The 
companies in the sample with the largest average turnover over the period are mostly from 
the oil industry (Exxon Mobil, Shell, BP), the largest utilities in Europe (E.ON, Eni, GDF 
Suez) or their core business has a low carbon nature, as in case of Volkswagen or Daimer. 
In addition, larger companies may have much greater scope for internal emissions 
reductions, allowing them to be compliant without having to explore external options. In 
contrast smaller installations may have less ‘low-hanging fruit’ and thus meeting their 
compliance needs via external options may be more attractive. Testing this hypothesis is an 
interesting avenue for future research. 
While over-allocation is expected to reduce the exposure of these firms to carbon costs, an 
alternative explanation is that over-allocation creates new opportunities and demand for 
engagement in offsets by increasing the internal capacity to undertake offsetting. Despite 
these firms holding sufficient allowances to cover their own emissions an incentive remained 
to engage in offset activity due to the prevailing price differential between offsets and 
allowances.  
Interviews also gave insights into the nature of the relationships between firm size, 
allocation, banking and investment into offsetting. Some overallocated companies made 
strategic decisions prior to the launch of Phase 2, especially regarding project investment 
and designation of a devoted trading desk, creating the internal capacity to offset. As 
allowances in Phase 2 were grandfathered, companies with a surplus of credits were 
motivated by extracting profit and if their banked allowances exceeded their yearly emissions 
and financial transactions, the risk of non-compliance was eliminated. Thus, commitment to 
pre-established offsetting strategy and a mix of lower risks and access to investment 
possibilities also influence the uptake of offsetting in Phase 2. 
That offset use cannot be easily explained by simple firm and allocation characteristics 
suggests that the role of unobserved factors is likely to be important. The existing literature 
highlights the role of corporate culture and personalities as well as risk preference, for 
example, and their importance was confirmed through semi-structured interviews conducted 
in this analysis.   
Key phenomenon such as how companies have conceptually treated the EU ETS may also 
be key determinants of offset activity. Other studies (Laing et al 2015) have found that some 
companies have viewed emissions trading as a regulatory activity to be led by the 
environmental management department, whilst others have treated it as just another form of 
cost to be minimised and led by the finance department. In the case of the former a budget 
is allocated and regulatory targets are met, in the case of the latter assets are traded in order 
to minimise costs and maximise profits. In the former there is little incentive to engage in 
offsetting for cost minimisation purposes (although some of the ‘softer’ reasons for offsetting 
such as technology testing could still be applicable), in the latter however there are strong 
incentives to find the cheapest long-term option to meet companies regulatory requirements. 
Understanding whether there are sectoral, geographical or temporal differences in whether 
firms adopted the first or second approach is a key research task to understand not only 
offsetting behaviour, but the response to emissions trading more generally.  
This paper finds some initial evidence to support the phenomena of ‘insetting’ within the EU 
ETS. Although this phenomenon has been discussed in the literature there has been no 
previous study of how and where it has happened in practice. We find that some amount of 
insetting has occurred especially through the JI mechanism within the steel sector in firms 
with subsidiaries in Russia and Poland.  
This selective use of insetting also links to the importance of internal trading and offsetting 
capacity. We find that having subsidiaries in JI countries is generally more important than 
having subsidiaries in CDM countries in determining the use of offsets. JI was a different 
mechanism to the CDM with less central institutional support and a less well-developed 
secondary market. Therefore, to engage in offset activity with the mechanism greater 
understanding of, and capacity to operate in, countries where JI was located is required than 
for CDM projects. Firms with subsidiaries in these countries therefore are likely to have 
much greater capacity to engage in these projects than those without. 
The data that we use is limited to use of any type of CDM or JI credit by companies. It does 
not allow us to examine the important distinction between the motivations of those engaged 
in directly investing in primary CERs or ERUs and purchasing on the secondary market. 
There is a clear distinction between these two types of products, and thus we would expect 
different characteristics between the two types of investors. Investing in primary offsets 
represents a potentially greater, more long-term commitment by firms in the projects 
generating those credits. This potentially allows the companies greater control over the 
quality of the offsets, or at least greater information on this quality, and also offers the 
potential to reap non-monetary, non-emission rewards from the offset projects, such as 
corporate social responsibility benefits. Secondary purchasers on the other hand may find it 
more difficult to procure information on quality and cannot reap these ‘soft’ benefits from 
offsetting. The EU ETS’s drive towards higher quality offsets has meant a sharp-drop off in 
the secondary market (World Bank 2014). Our interview evidence also highlights that a 
number of firms have had non-monetary, non-emission reasons for investing in the amount 
and type of offset projects, highlighting their demand for primary CERs rather than through 
the secondary market.  
Overall, this paper highlights the importance of understanding the determinants and 
motivations behind offsetting, to improve the efficiency of the design of carbon markets that 
aims to maximise the uptake of international credits for compliance. The EU ETS experience 
showed clearly that cheap prices of CERs and ERUs were insufficient to attract demand, 
and that demand was driven by a multitude of factors and involved a large element of risk 
given high levels of uncertainty in the market. Indeed, this research presents evidence that 
some companies are more cautious with involvement in new projects outside of their core 
business activity, preferring to undertake ‘insetting’ than ‘offsetting’. Understanding and 
anticipating these risk or regulatory preferences can help improve the efficiency of offsetting 
– e.g. in predicting demand in California’s cap-and-trade programme where offsets are
currently being used (IETA 2015). 
The existence of the insetting phenomenon is interesting for a number of reasons. Such 
engagement of firms in primary credits generation can have positive effects for stimulating 
international technology transfers, which may be one of the aims of the flexible mechanisms. 
It may also have a positive effect on greening supply chains. To pursue such aims and 
engage such sectors in the offset market, a strong and long-term price signal and certain 
political messages are likely to be important, to help companies develop strategies to commit 
to international offsetting projects. However, it is also important to evaluate the efficiency of 
using insetting as a strategy to optimise international technology diffusion vis-a-vis other 
policy instruments. Re-evaluating the objectives and performance of offsetting (e.g. to what 
extend did it reduce abatement costs or help technology transfer?) is another important area 
for future research. 
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APPENDIX – INTERVIEW OUTLINE 
1. Could you explain the structure of your company; in which countries does it operate
globally and within Europe? What is the level of integration of different 
installations/subsidiaries? 
2. At what level was the decision about mitigation strategy made for each single
installation compliant within the EU ETS? 
3. Has your company created a special department to trade and manage the portfolio of
credits? Was the service outsourced to another company? 
4. Did your company invest in the primary CDM projects or JI projects or purchase
credits directly from the sources? What was the motivation behind this decision? 
5. When obtaining credits, did you use exchanges, brokers, OTC transactions to obtain
your credits? Did your company buy credits from your competitors in Europe or invest 
in CDM projects in installations from your sector? 
6. Was your company motivated mainly by financial benefits of using offsets and looked
for cheapest available projects or ways to obtain credits? Were there any other 
benefits that were taken into account? 
7. How was such potential investment in a project assessed? Which risks were
accounted for? 
8. Did the financial crisis and overallocation of allowances affect your company's
strategy? 
9. How would you evaluate the significance of transaction costs and the economy of
scale from obtaining many credits from one source? 
10. How would you assess the role of banking and borrowing of credits within Phase II?
Has it influenced your compliance strategy? 
